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Abstract
The terrorist attacks of the United States (US) World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001; Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005; London Bombing in
2005; and the Mumbai bombing in 2008 had left some very detrimental
global perceptional impacts on the Muslims and Islamic financial institutions
globally. As most of these attacks were carried out by some militant
Islamicists, understandably there were a lot of public skepticism against
the Muslims and the religion of Islam. In the United States of America (USA)
for example, following the attacks on September 11, the US government
enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, which is basically designed to prevent the
use of the US financial system to help fund terrorism and other crimes. The
enactment of the PATRIOT Act 2001 had accelerated the establishment of
similar laws globally. In Malaysia particularly, the Anti Money Laundering
and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act was introduced in 2001 and amended in
2007 to include more emphasis on the terrorist financing aspects. By virtue
of these Acts, terrorist financing is a criminal offence. To date, most writings
implicating Islamic financial institutions with terrorist financing are either
written by Western authors or the articles are perceptional in nature. This
conceptual paper reviews previous studies on this topic, examines related
legislations, progresses to propose research strategies on how to counter
these perceptional biases and highlights preventive mechanisms adopted
by the Malaysian Islamic financial institutions in mitigating and detecting
terrorists financing.
Keywords: terrorist financing; Anti-Money Laundering; Islamic
Financial  Inst i tut ions; perceptional study; public perception;
perceptional impact
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Introduction
Following the September 11 attacks, there were a lot of anger and skepticisms among
the public towards Muslims and the religion of Islam. Some were even quick to equate
terrorism with Islam. One of the earlier efforts undertaken by the United States (US)
government to diffuse public fear towards terrorism was the enactment of the Patriot
Act in 2001. PATRIOT which stands for “Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism” is a law specifically established to prevent and deter
individuals, groups of individuals or even corporations to use the US financial system
to help fund terrorism and other forms of crimes. Since the Act was established, all
countries wishing to deal with the US financial markets had to adopt a much heightened
and strict financial regulations. One of the immediate actions taken by the US government
when the Patriot Act was first established was the freezing of “oil money” from the US
financial system. “Oil money” symbolises funds invested by some very rich Middle
Eastern investors in financial institutions in the US. Due to the much strict requirements
and procedures, new “oil money” investors were discouraged from placing their money
in the US. Some researchers (e.g. Dusuki, 2008; Henry and Wilson, 2006) posited that
the introduction of the Patriot Act in the US had indirectly spurred the development of
the Islamic financial Institutions (IFIs) globally. The “oil money” investors started to
divert their investment into these IFIs. The growth of the IFIs has been phenomenal.
For example, in the 2007 Mc Kinsey report on The World Islamic Banking
Competitiveness – it is stated that Islamic assets are expected to hit USD1 trillion by
2010, with an average growth rate of 15%-20% per annum. Other IFIs’ products are also
showing increasing trends. Table 1 depicts the other relevant statistics on IFIs.
Table 1: Quick Statistics of IFIs
Asset Types Statistics
Islamic Assets Under Management USD750 billion and expected to grow to
USD1 trillion by 2010 (average rate of growth
15%-20% p.a.
Islamic Mutual Funds USD300 billion (average growth rate 23% p.a)
Takaful Contributions USD7.2 billion (average growth rate 13% p.a)
Global Market Capitalisation of USD10 trillion
Dow Jones Islamic Index
Shari’ah Compliant Global Funds 680 funds
Global Outstanding Sukuk USD107 billion (average growth rate 22%)
No of IFIs More than 600 IFIs in the World
Source: McKinsey The World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2008
This paper is divided into four main sections. Following this introductory note, Section
Two describes the development of IFIs in Malaysia. Section Three reviews previous
studies and write-ups on this topic and attempts to understand public’s perceptions in
linking terrorist financing with IFIs. Section Four briefly elaborates on AMLATFA 2001
and explains how this Act is expected to influence the operations of the banking industry
and in particular the IFIs in Malaysia. Although AMLATFA covers the legislations of
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both money laundering and terrorist financing, this paper gives more focus on the latter
(aspect of terrorist financing). Section Five proposes a collaborative research to enhance
public understanding and to counter negative perceptions towards IFIs.
Development of Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia
The development of IFIs in Malaysia was dated way back in 1983. Malaysia was then
one of four countries1 that initiated the establishment of Islamic banks. Supported by a
well-developed financial system, what is unique about Malaysia is the fact that
conventional and Islamic financial institutions exist side by side, interacting with one
another. One of the government’s earlier aspirations when setting up the IFIs was to
play a leading role in serving the Muslim Ummah and to enhance the socio-economic
development of the country.
Malaysia is at the forefront of Islamic finance and has the world’s most vibrant and
comprehensive Islamic financial system. As any other commercial financial institutions,
the operations of IFIs are being supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Malaysia
(a.k.a. Bank Negara Malaysia)2. Today, there is a significant number of full-fledged Islamic
banks in this country3. This includes several foreign owned IFIs4; and conventional
institutions that have established Islamic subsidiaries. Today, Malaysia continues to
progress and to build on the industry by inviting foreign financial institutions to establish
international Islamic banking business and to conduct foreign currency business (Bank
Negara website at http://www.bnm.gov.my). Presently, Malaysia’s Islamic banking assets
have reached USD65.6 billion with an average growth rate of 18-20% annually5. The
report further noted that the Islamic banking assets at the end of the second quarter of
this year, constitute close to 19 percent of the total banking assets. Total financing
currently amounts to 118 billion ringgit which accounts for 20.1 percent of the total
financing portfolio of the banking industry.
Perceptions on Muslims and Islamic Financial Institutions
Public negative perceptions towards the religion of Islam and Muslims are not a myth. In
fact, a 2006’s post 9/11 poll conducted by the ABC News and the Washington Post
presents clear documentary evidence which revealed that 46% of Americans expressed
an unfavorable opinion of Islam. Describing the same survey, Ali, S. N & Syed A.R (2010)
further noted the findings of the poll stated that six out of ten Americans believed that
Islam was “prone to violent extremism”; and another 25% of those surveyed also admitted
to “prejudicial feelings” against Muslims and Arabs. The negative perceptions had indeed
double that of a similar survey conducted in 2002.
In their paper titled “Public Support for Civil Liberties Pre- and Post-9/11”, Sullivan and
Hendriks (2009) noted that whilst the American public was very intolerant of communists,
socialists, and atheists in the 1950s and 1960s, the current intolerance is focused more on
Muslim Americans and right-wing racists. The finding is very similar to a 2004 study by
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Cornell University. It was found that the September 11 attack had created public fears
towards terrorism and almost half of those polled proposed that the US government
should curtail civil liberties for Muslim Americans.
The negative perception towards Muslims is not just confined to the US. A Pew Global
Attitudes Project conducted in 13 countries including the US, Britain, Spain, France and
Germany revealed that most respondents felt that Muslims are “violent and fanatical”6.
Figure 1 summarises their opinions. In general, the respondents considered relations
between Muslims and Westerners as “generally bad” after the September 11 terrorism.
Some studies (e.g. Weber, 2008 Levitt, 2003) had also viewed organisations such as non-
profit organisations, philanthropy group and financial institutions as possible avenue of
terrorist financing. In a later study, Schneider (2010) noted how the Al-Qaeda group had
used the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank in Khartoum Sudan to transfer funds to various companies
owned by Osama Bin Laden. Another renowned bank such as the Citibank was also
implicated by the terrorist in their terrorist financing scheme. On a similar notation, Basile
(2004) documented how the Al-Qaeda group successfully made small financial transfers
using under-regulated Islamic banking networks throughout the world to move funds
from one country to another. Similarly, Weiss (2005) found that terrorists seek increasingly
more informal methods of earning and moving money. The financial support of terrorism
involves both earning funds, through legal and illegal means, and the illicit movement of
money to terrorist groups
A 2008 research conducted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) highlighted a
trend by terrorism financiers of using the complex commercial arrangement of financial
institutions to avoid money trail. Some other writings implicating Islamic financial
 Figure 1: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other
(Source: Pew Global Attitude Project 2006)
Terrorist Financing and Perceptions on Islamic Financial Institutions
169
institutions with terrorist financing are perceptional in nature (e.g. Pieth, 2006; Drakos,
K, 2004; Chen & Siems, 2004; Zagaris, 2004; Schneider, 2010). At the lower end, perception
represents a simple process of interpreting and organising one’s thought of the meaning
of a concept. However, if left uncontrolled, perception may ultimately lead to unconscious
prejudice and biases.
Ali, S.N & Syed A.R (2010) in his recent research article entitled “Post 9/11 Perceptions
of Islamic Finance” focused on three sources of data: review of mainstream media in the
US, survey of Islamic finance industry professionals and an examination of Islamic
finance media professionals globally. The review of US mainstream media revealed very
few articles linking Islamic finance with terrorism and only 12% of the media maintained
a negative tone. Most Islamic financial professionals considered the 9/11 event as a
“blessing in disguise” as it marked the resurgence of Islamic finance which brought
closer scrutiny of the industry. The Global Islamic finance media professionals perceived
a negative impact and most were not happy with the way the industry handled media
attention. Efforts to counter negative global media perception should therefore be
heightened. One of the best ways to negate negative perceptions is to educate the
public and to increase their awareness of the actual situation by giving facts and
figures of actual practices7.
Laws to Counter Terrorism Financing
Based on the backdrop of the various perceptions listed in the previous section, the
current section reviews the Malaysian legislations pertaining to terrorist financing and
hopes to establish if the public perceptions could be countered by giving actual facts on
what is being practiced by IFIs to mitigate terrorist financing. The passing of the USA
Patriot Act 2001 had quickly made its footing globally and today, many governments of
other countries have established or are establishing similar laws. In Malaysia, the
legislation governing terrorist financing is covered under the Anti-Money Laundering
and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act (AMLATFA, 2001). The Act specifies terrorist financing
as “the act of providing financial support, either through a legitimate or illegitimate source,
to terrorists or terrorist organisations to enable them to carry out terrorist acts”. Although
it is expected that most of these funds originate from some forms of criminal activities,
some of the monies may have been derived from legitimate sources (e.g. funds raised by
non-profit organiations and public donations).
As a market leader in Islamic finance, Malaysia views negative public perceptions very
seriously. In ensuring effective implementation of AMLATFA, the National Co-ordination
Committee (NCC) to Counter Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing was established
by the government. The NCC is in turn entrusted to ensure that all national efforts are
aligned with other regional and international practices. Currently, the NCC membership
comprises fifteen (the numbers may have increased) Federal Ministries and Government
agencies: (i) Anti-Corruption Agency; (ii) Attorney-General’s Chambers; (iii) Central Bank;
(iv) Companies Commission of Malaysia; (v) Immigration Department of Malaysia; (vi)
Inland Revenue Board; (vii) Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority; (viii) Ministry
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of Finance; (ix) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (x) Ministry of Internal Security; (xi) Ministry
of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs; (xii) Registrar of Societies; (xiii) Royal Malaysian
Customs; (xiv) Royal Malaysia Police and (xv) Securities Commission. The Central Bank
of Malaysia, through the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is responsible for supervising
and regulating the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/
CFT) compliance of all the financial institutions in this country8.
Four specific sections of the Malaysian Penal Code (hence, implicating criminal offence)
are dedicated to terrorism financing offences. They are Section 130N – Providing or
collecting property for terrorist acts; Section 1300 – Providing services for terrorist
purposes; Section 130P – Arranging for retention or control of terrorist property and
Section 130Q – Dealing with terrorist property9. AMLATFA 2001 is indeed a very powerful
legislation. The Act covers “any serious offence, foreign serious offence or unlawful
activity whether committed before or after the commencement date”. In addition to its
retrospective application, AMLATFA also supersedes several other legislations in this
country. Upon conviction, the AMLATFA offenders have to pay a hefty fine plus
imprisonment.
How does the law affect the IFIs? In Malaysia, the AML/CFT programme is implemented
on an incremental basis. The first group of Reporting Institutions (RIs) is the banks
(including Islamic banks) which form the largest component of the financial system. The
next group of RIs still fall within the definition of financial institutions such as the insurance
and Takaful industries, offshore entities, capital market intermediaries, development
financial institutions and money changers. A 2004 Amendment to AMLATFA had redefined
Reporting Institutions to also include the Designated Non-Financial Businesses and
Professions (DNFBPs) sector. In Malaysia, DNFBPs comprise accountants, lawyers, real
estate agents, company secretaries and casinos. Effective 2007, dealers of precious metals
and precious stones had been added. Hence, if the RIs are suspicious of their clients’
transactions (for possible money laundering or terrorist financing), they must immediately
report their suspicion to the FIU at the Central Bank of Malaysia by giving details such as
the person conducting the transaction; information of the account holder or his/her
beneficiary; details of the transaction; and description of the suspicious transactions10.
As indicated earlier on, the FIU was established in 2001 within the Central Bank of Malaysia
to support an effective implementation of AMLATFA. Basically, FIU represents the central
agency which receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) from various reporting
agencies. FIU then reports and disseminate financial intelligence to the appropriate law
enforcement agencies for investigation into suspected criminal activities.
In a nutshell, it could be seen that the legislations to counter terrorist financing in Malaysia
are fairly comprehensive. Financial institutions are also expected to create a position of an
Anti Money Laundering (AML) officer within their banking organisations. The AML
officer is responsible to monitor the AMLATFA compliance by the banks. For an Islamic
financial institution in particular, there’s another layer of management governance, the
Shari’ah Advisory Council (SAC) that must be established. This is the result of the
passing of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 which has allowed the central bank to
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establish a National Shari’ah Council, “the high sole authority to be referred by the civil
courts in dealing with Islamic banking and finance cases in Malaysia.
Moving Forward
It could be concluded that perceptions linking Islamic financial institutions with terrorist
financing do exist. However their presence has not deterred the development of the
Islamic finance industry. In fact it was evidenced that the industry has grown much
stronger and the prospect of IFIs to flourish further is very encouraging (Nazim Ali, 2010).
Existing legislations governing financial institutions in Malaysia, especially those related
to terrorist financing are in place and are in support of the country’s and other global
initiatives. The banking industry is one of the most stringent and protected industries in
Malaysia. In addition to AMLATFA, IFIs are also governed by the Banking and Financial
Institutions Act (BAFIA 1989) and the Islamic Banking Act 1983 (Amended 2009).
To counter these negative perceptions, deliberate efforts must be shown and taken to
educate the public. It is important, for example, that the Central Bank of Malaysia,
Conventional banks, Islamic financial institutions, Financial Intelligence Unit, Royal
Malaysia Police, Securities Commissions and others conduct collaborative research to
explain the mechanisms used by these institutions to detect, investigate and prevent
terrorist financing within the IFIs’ financial system. Based on recent interviews with
various agencies including the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Central Bank of
Malaysia, the Royal Malaysia Police and a few Islamic financial institutions, the author
was informed of ways (some are electronically done through computerised system) used
by banks to detect suspicious transactions which might implicate terrorist financing.
Notes
1 The other three countries were Iran, Pakistan and Sudan
2 Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA), Islamic Banking Act 1983
3 See Appendix 1 for details
4 See Appendix 2 for details
5 McKinsey The World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2008
6 PEW Global Attitude Project 2006
7 Example of such practice is the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT) Regime set up by The Central Bank of Malaysia
8 AMLATFA 2001 – Part III Financial Intelligence, Section 7 Functions of the
competent authority. (1) The Minister of Finance may, by order published in the
Gazette, appoint a person to be the competent authority and such person shall
have all the functions conferred on the competent authority by this Act. (2) The
competent authority may authorise any of its officers or any other person to perform
any or all its functions or render such assistance in the performance of its functions
under this Act as it may specify.
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9 Anti-Money Laundering Act 2003
10 Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism by Financial
Intelligence Unit, the Central Bank of Malaysia
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Appendixes
Appendix 1
List of Malaysia’s Islamic Banks
- Affin Islamic Bank Berhad
- Alliance Islamic Bank Berhad
- AmIslamic Bank Berhad
- Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad
- Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad
- CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad
- EONCAP Islamic Bank Berhad
- Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad
- Maybank Islamic Berhad
- Public Islamic Bank Berhad
- RHB Islamic Bank Berhad
- Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia
Appendix 2
List of Foreign Own Islamic Bank in Malaysia
- Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corporation (Malaysia) Berhad
- Asian Finance Bank Berhad
- HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad
- Kuwait Finance House (Malaysia) Berhad
- OCBC Al-Amin Bank Berhad
- Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad
